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Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to inform on the current state of knowledge of the
economics profession of the impacts of state and local taxes on property values. Our
goal is also to suggest how to interpret some of the findings of this literature as well as
to provide some conceptual background to assist in interpreting these findings.
I.

Introduction

Section I provides a brief introduction to the material along with an outline for
the study.

II. The Implications of Interjurisdictional Mobility on Tax Incidence and Impacts
Critical to understanding and interpreting the impacts of taxes on both business
location and property values is the Tiebout hypothesis. Section II discusses the Tiebout
hypothesis. Tiebout contended that:
o Households (and firms) are mobile among jurisdictions, be they states or
localities, and will choose where to locate among these jurisdictions based on
the taxes and public services provided by the jurisdiction, as well as nongovernment provided amenities.
o Sorting of households and firms among jurisdictions can lead to both an
efficient sorting based on preferences for services and taxes, as well as an
efficient provision of public services by jurisdictional governments.
III.

State and Local Fiscal Policies and Property Value

Numerous empirical studies examining the determinants of property values
indicate that increases in property tax rates, when controlling for the level of public
service, will reduce residential property values.
•

Evidence of the negative relationship between property values and tax rates
suggests that households are influenced by property tax rates when making
decisions about where to reside. This is one of the central tenets of the Tiebout
Hypothesis.
o The magnitude of the reduction is referred to as the capitalization rate, a
100% capitalization rate would mean that a 10% increase in the property
tax rate would reduce property values by 10%; a 50% capitalization rate
means a reduction of 5% in property values for the same tax increase.
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o Studies of the capitalization of property taxes are distinguished by studies
examining inter-jurisdictional differences in taxes and property tax rates
and studies considering intra-jurisdictional differences generally due to
differences between assessed and market value. The evidence from the
most reliable estimates using data on individual properties and market
values suggests capitalization rates between 60% and 90%.
•

In addition to taxes affecting property values, public services, particularly
primary and secondary education, affect property values.
o Studies of the impact of education on property values suggest that not
only does educational spending positively affect property values, but so
do measures of achievement (test scores or graduation rate) as well as
inputs in production (student/teacher) ratio for the school or district.
o Economic theory suggests that the efficient level of public services is the
level that provides the highest property value when both the positive
impact of educational spending and the negative impact of the taxes used
to finance it are considered. Numerous studies indicate that the claim that
educational spending is at an efficient level, that is, the level that
maximizes property values can not be rejected.

IV.

Taxes and Property Values: How and Why does it Matter?
While not a direct measure of economic well-being, examining the impacts of
balanced-budget changes in tax policies (both tax and public services) on
employment might offer some insights into the desirability of the current level of
taxes (and public services) as well as the current mix of taxes.
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I.

Introduction

I.A

The Focus of the Study
It is the purpose of this study to review and evaluate an extensive literature

within the field of economics that examines the impacts of state and local fiscal policies,
particularly those labeled “economic development” policies. Within this extensive and
diverse literature on state and local fiscal policies, in this report we identify and discuss
a strand of the literature that focuses on how fiscal policies, in this case primarily,
though not exclusively, property taxation, affect housing markets, or, more specifically,
property values.
In our companion piece, Hoyt and Garen (2006), we discuss two related branches
of the literatures on state and local fiscal policies. One branch focuses on the impacts of
state and local fiscal policies, primarily but not exclusively taxes, on economic
development, usually measured in terms of employment. The other branch considers
the “global” impacts of local and state tax and expenditure policies – how the policies
chosen by one state or locality will affect the economic conditions and fiscal policies of
its neighboring or “competing” jurisdictions.
The purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive discussion of the
multitude of studies on this topic but instead to attempt the more challenging task of
evaluating which studies are most relevant and discerning conclusions and inferences
from often contradictory studies in a literature economists have been contributing to for
over forty years. Our primary interest is what the findings of these studies suggest
regarding the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on real estate markets.
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I.A.1 Taxes and Property Value
Since a seminal study by Wallace Oates published in the Journal of Political
Economy in 1969, a multitude of studies have examined the relationship between
primarily local, rather than state, fiscal policies and property values. Not surprisingly,
the fiscal policy of most interest has generally been the property tax. However,
numerous other studies have focused on the impacts of government expenditures
rather than taxes on property values. The majority of these studies have considered
how primary and secondary educational expenditures or quality of education, by a
variety of measures, have affected property values. Other studies, fewer in number,
consider how government policies or services, such as police and safety or parks and
recreation, affect property values.
We attempt to offer some insights into what this voluminous and diverse
literature offers in regard to the impact of local government taxes and policies on
property values. In addition to discussing the results of studies that offer evidence of
the impact of local policies from the analysis of data on property values and local
policies, we also discuss in a very general and non-technical way some of the more
theoretical literature that provides a motivation for the extensive empirical research on
this topic. Specifically, we discuss and explain how evidence on taxes and other local
government policies affect property values and can be interpreted as evidence that: 1)
households (and firms) are mobile among local governments and their location
decisions are influenced by government policies; and 2) that local government
tax/service policies are or are not efficiently provided.
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I.B

Background and Underlying Economic Theory
Before our discussion of studies examining the impacts of fiscal policies on

property values we provide a very brief discussion of the “Tiebout” hypothesis (Tiebout
(1956)), a theory of state and local governments that is central to both the understanding
of some of the methodology employed in these studies as well as the implications of
some of their findings.
I.C

State and Local Tax Policies in Practice
While the focus of this report is on the findings of previous studies examining

the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on property values rather than providing
new evidence on this topic, in order to give some context of the potential importance
and implications of these studies some summary measures and descriptions of both
current and past state and local tax practices are included.
II.

The Implications of Interjurisdictional Mobility on Tax Incidence and Impacts
As briefly discussed in Hoyt and Garen (2006), in the traditional framework for

tax analysis, the determinants of the incidence of the tax, that is, whether consumers or
produces pay the tax depends on the relative elasticity of the demand and supply
curves for the tax product. What the traditional framework does not address but is
important for analysis of state and local taxes is the possibility of tax avoidance through
mobility. While high federal taxes could conceivably and may possibly lead to emigration for some, it is certainly more costly and less likely to be as important as the possibility of migration from one state to another or from one locality to another within a
metropolitan area to avoid higher taxes. For example when considering the impacts of
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federal income taxation, any elasticity of labor supply is likely to be attributed to
changes in the labor supply of individual workers or possibly changes in labor force
participation. When considering the impacts of state income taxation, the elasticity of
labor supply is likely to be attributed to migration from one state to another as a result
of tax changes, rather than changes in individual labor supply, though this may happen
as well.
II.A

The Tiebout Hypothesis
In addition to potentially increasing the responsiveness of labor supply and

demand, as well as the demand and supply for other outputs to changes in taxes, interjurisdictional mobility may lead to a more efficient mix of taxes and public services as
suggested by Charles Tiebout in a paper published in 1956 in the Journal of Political
Economy. In this seminal paper, Tiebout introduced the notion that states and localities
could be viewed as competitive “clubs” providing a mix of public services and taxes to
finance them. If people and business capital are mobile among states or localities, then,
Tiebout argued, state and local governments should be able to attract both residents
and businesses by offering desirable tax/public service bundles. Tiebout argued that
this competitive framework could potentially lead to both an efficient mix of public services and an efficient sorting of people and businesses among localities and states.
Tiebout’s paper is brief (seven pages) and very informal in style. In the fifty
years following the publication of this paper, a voluminous literature based on this
article has arisen to formalize and extend the limited analysis that Tiebout offered.
While some of this research will be discussed in this report, most of it is only tangential
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to our interests. Two central tenets of the Tiebout hypothesis, as generally interpreted,
are important to understanding both the methodology and findings of the literature we
review. These central tenets might be summarized as:
1)

Households (and firms) are mobile among jurisdictions, be they states or
localities, and will choose where to locate among these jurisdictions based on the
taxes and public services provided by the jurisdiction, as well as nongovernment provided amenities;

2)

Sorting of households and firms among jurisdictions can lead to both an efficient
sorting based on preferences for services and taxes, as well as an efficient
provision of public services by jurisdictional governments.

II.B

Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis
Tiebout, and others that followed, argued that locational decisions are influenced

not only by taxes but also by public service provision. That both taxes and public services should matter in locational decisions of both firms and households suggests that
any studies that attempt to examine how taxes influence employment and household or
firm location decisions also need to consider the impact of public services. This
requires, then, quantification and data on public service provision.
As discussed in more detail in our review of studies on fiscal policy and property
values, efficient fiscal policies would entail that the incremental benefits to residents
and firms in a jurisdiction from increases in public expenditures should be exactly offset
by the incremental cost to them of financing these expenditures with taxes. That these
incremental benefits and costs should be equated for fiscal policies to be efficient means
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that with efficient policies, small balanced-budget changes in expenditure/tax increases
should have little impact on the movement of firms and residents among states or on
property values. Thus, the insignificant, or even positive, impacts found in early
studies of the impacts of taxes on employment or other measures of economic activity
might be due to the failure to control for expenditures – what these results may suggest
is that the increase in taxes, also associated with a balanced-budget increase in public
services not quantified, is approximately efficient. Analogously, in the literature on the
impact of state and local fiscal policies on property values, a finding of no impact of the
property tax on property values when no measure of public expenditures is included in
the analysis is viewed as evidence of the efficient provision of public services.
If, as the Tiebout hypothesis suggests, changes in employment or other economic
activity due to changes in state and local taxes are primarily the result of interjurisdictional mobility, the inefficiency or excess burden associated with a state tax is
not directly related to the change in state output due to that tax as suggested in the preceding section. If, in this case, unlike the case with federal taxes, the loss in tax base in
one jurisdiction, the employment or capital (firms) there, leads to an equal increase in
the tax base of competing jurisdictions, there is no excess burden from the imposition of
the state tax or, at a minimum, the excess burden is overstated. Thus, while the impact
of increases in state and local taxes on employment or capital within a jurisdiction may
be of interest, it is inappropriate to equate them directly with excess burden. Further, as
we discuss in our review of the literature on tax competition, if state and local
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governments ignore how their tax decisions positively affect their neighbors’ tax bases,
as is likely, state and local taxes will be inefficiently set.
III. State and Local Fiscal Policies and Property Value
Since the late 1960’s with the publication of studies by authors such as Wallace
Oates (1969), there have been numerous studies – far more than we intend to discuss or
even document --of the determinants of property value with a particular interest in
what impact state and local fiscal policies have on property values. While the majority
of these studies have been empirical, numerous theoretical studies have examined how
and why state and local fiscal policies, both taxes and expenditures, might affect
property values.
While documenting the impact of fiscal policies, particularly property taxation,
on property values is the primary objective of many of these studies, for many of these
studies the impact of the fiscal policies on property values was viewed as evidence
about broader issues. While not encompassing the objectives of all studies on property
values and fiscal policies, we offer six general objectives typically pursued by studies of
fiscal policy and capitalization:
1. Empirical studies focused on the extent of capitalization and the distribution of
incidence between owners and consumers of housing;
2. Empirical studies that view the existence of capitalization of both taxes and public
expenditures as evidence in support of “Tiebout” residential mobility;
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3. Empirical studies that view evidence of public expenditures or measures of the
quality of public services positively affecting property values as evidence of the
value of these services to residents.
4. Empirical studies that examine whether local public expenditures, generally primary
and secondary education, are efficiently provided by evaluating the impacts of these
services on property values.
5. Empirical studies that attempt to obtain demand curves for public expenditures or
locational expenditures from estimates of their impacts on residential property
values.
6. Theoretical studies that provide models and predictions of how fiscal policies might
affect property values and the distributional impacts of fiscal policies, particularly
property taxes.
Many of these objectives are found in single studies; for example, studies that
examine the relationship between fiscal policies and property values as evidence of
“Tiebout” mobility often examine this relationship for evidence of the stronger assertion
of Tiebout that public goods and services provided by local governments should be
provided efficiently. Here our primary interest will be on studies that provide
empirical evidence on the relationship between property values on fiscal policies, both
property taxes and public expenditures, with most of the attention being directed
towards primary and secondary education. While we briefly discuss some of the
theoretical literature on capitalization in a very general way, we will provide only
summaries focused on the empirically testable predictions of these studies. We do not
10

discuss here the more complex issue of attempting to obtain demand curves for public
expenditures or amenities based on estimating the relationship between property
values and public services and locational amenities. We begin with a brief overview of
the general empirical methodology.
III.A

Estimating the Relationship between Property Values and State and Local Fiscal Policies
We begin our discussion by simply stating, in the form of an equation, the basic

relationship that has traditionally been estimated, with modifications and extensions,
since the seminal work of Oates. The equation may be expressed as
PVij = β 0 + β1τ j + β 2 H i + β 3G j + β 4 A j + ε ij

where PVij is the value of house i in community j; τj is the property tax rate in
community j; Hi are characteristics of the house (square footage, number of rooms,
bedrooms, bathrooms, lot size, etc.); Gj includes measures of public service
expenditures or public service quality (for example, primary and secondary educational
spending per student; educational test scores); Aj might refer to locational amenities;
and εij is the “error” in the equation representing random or determinants of property
value that cannot be estimated or quantified. This equation is referred to in the
literature as a “hedonic” equation. As we discuss later, this specification of the
relationship between property values and property taxes is not technically correct and
should be view as an approximation. Later we discuss the specification of the equation
estimated in more recent studies on property tax capitalization.
Then the purpose of the statistical analysis is to estimate values for the
coefficients (β’s) in the equation. While the specification of the equation suggests using
11

data on individual house values in a number of different jurisdictions (micro-data)
generally obtained from the multiple listing service (MLS), the property value assessor
(PVA) or the American Housing Survey (AHS), many studies examine mean or median
property value in a municipality, data readily obtainable from the Census of Population
and Housing based on self-reported values. Generally in the equation estimated, the
dependent variable is not property value but the natural logarithm of it (LN(PV)). The
measure of the tax rate is also transformed to be the natural logarithm of the tax rate.
There are two reasons for making these transformations. First, it appears that the
logarithmic relationship is a better fit to the data and, second, it provides a nice
interpretation – the coefficient on the natural logarithm of the tax rate provides an
elasticity measure. Thus, if we find the coefficient, β1, equal to -.75, we can interpret
this as evidence that a 10% increase in the rate of property taxation will reduce property
values by 7.5%. This measure, when discussing property taxes, is referred to as the
“capitalization” rate. Full capitalization is a coefficient of -1 with “undercapitalization” a rate between 0 and -1 and “over-capitalization” a rate below -1.
III.B The Theory of Tax Capitalization and the Impacts of Local Fiscal Policies on Property
Values
Wallace Oates in his early, seminal paper examining the relationship between the
median house value, property tax rates, and educational spending per student among
other variables for northern New Jersey communities in 1960 found evidence that
higher property taxes had a significant adverse (negative) impact on median house
value and that increased educational spending had a significant positive impact when
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controlling for the characteristics of the housing stock in the community as well as
community locational amenities (distance from New York CBD). He and others
following him interpreted the signs and significance of these coefficients as evidence in
support of the “Tiebout” hypothesis. Why? From Oates (1969) a summary of the
decision facing households when choosing a residence,
In terms of the Tiebout model, we can conceive of a utility-maximizing consumer
who weighs the benefits stemming from the program of local public services
against the cost of his tax liability and chooses as a residence that locality which
provides him with the greatest surplus of benefits over costs (Oates, 1969, p. 959).
Then Oates continues to devise a ‘test’ of whether, in fact, households appear to choose
their community of residence following this cost-benefit approach,
Moreover, this suggests a way to determine whether the Tiebout hypothesis of
consumer location in accordance with preferences for local budgetary programs
has any relevance to actual behavior. If consumers, in their choice of locality of
residence, do consider the available program of public services, we would expect
to find that, other things being equal (including tax rates), gross rents (actual or
imputed) and therefore property values, would be higher in a community the
more attractive its package of public goods. Individual families, desiring to
consume higher levels of public output, would presumably tend to bid up property values in communities with high-quality programs of public services.
(Oates, 1969, p. 959).
In a perfectly competitive private market for goods and services, the supply
decision of a single firm will not affect the market price – any attempt by a firm in a
competitive industry, with numerous competitors offering identical or nearly identical
products to raise the price of its product above that of its competitors will result in the
loss of all its sales. Analogously a competitive setting for communities would have
many communities offering similar mixes and levels of public services with taxes set to
finance these services. For these services as well as locational amenities and the
13

characteristics of the property we can think of the price as being the property value
τ
τV
the present
gross of taxes V (1 + ) where r is the discount or interest rate making
r

r

value of property tax payments.1 Equivalently, the annualized gross rental cost is
R + T = (r + τ )V where R is the rent or annualized value and T is simply the tax payment,

τV. Although we make think of τ as the statutory property tax rate it is unlikely to be
the effective tax rate on the property. The distinction between the statutory and effective
rate of taxation is due to systematic differences between assessed and market values for
housing – the effective rate, the rate relevant to this discussion and typically used in
most studies, is equal to the product of the statutory rate and the ratio of assessed to
market value, the equalization rate.
Then, if households are mobile, as the Tiebout hypothesis assumes, and have a
large number of alternative communities with similar or, at the extreme, identical
services among which they can choose, then no community could increase the price of
its housing without increasing the quality of the amenities or services in the
community. This means that any increase in the tax rate without an increase in the
quality of public services must reduce the (net) value of housing (V) so that the gross
τ
value V (1 + ) remains unchanged. Then any increase in the present value of tax
r

payments should be offset by an equal reduction in the value of the house. This is
referred to as full capitalization.
This formulation assumes, as we discuss in more detail later, that the housing is an infinitely lived asset
making the present value of the infinite stream of costs simply annual cost (τV) divided by the discount
rate.
1
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At the other extreme, if households were immobile among communities or did
not have alternative communities in which they could reside and the assumptions of the
Tiebout hypothesis are violated, increases in a community’s tax rate would have no
effect – there is zero capitalization. Costly or limited mobility or limited alternative
communities would lead to incomplete capitalization – increases in the property tax
would reduce property values keeping gross property values constant. In a series of
papers, Hoyt (1991, 1992, 1993, 1999) models and considers the implications on
capitalization when there is a limited number of alternative communities or what he
refers to as imperfect competition. Then, in terms of estimating an equation in which
the natural logarithm of property values (LN(V)) is the dependent variable and the tax
rate is also measured by LN(τ), full capitalization gives a coefficient of -1; no
capitalization gives a coefficient of 0 and incomplete capitalization gives a coefficient
ranging from 0 to -1.
Oates arguments that the finding of capitalization of property taxes or public
services as evidence of support of the Tiebout hypothesis have not been universally
accepted among economists in this field. The model of communities and land that
generated capitalization had several attributes critical to obtaining capitalization of
public services and property taxes. The first attribute is that political jurisdictions were
of a fixed land area and the economy was of a limited land area, all of which was
residential use (in contrast to an agricultural fringe). The second attribute is that there
is a single or at least finite number of distinct types of consumers, at least with respect
to their demands for educational services.
15

Epple et.al. (1978) provide a formal model that illustrates the conditions under
which no capitalization can be obtained consistent with the Hamilton (1975, 1976) and
Edel and Sclar (1974) concept of long run equilibrium in a Tiebout model. The critical
assumption of the model by Epple et. al., as well as the others finding no capitalization,
is simply that there is a perfectly elastic supply of housing, that is, an elastic supply of
both land and capital for housing. One interpretation of this is that the housing stock
can respond quickly to changes in demands for housing and that housing at the fringe
of a metropolitan area is a very good substitute for housing interior to the metropolitan
area. This perfectly elastic supply of housing means that in equilibrium the price of a
unit of housing, property value, is determined entirely by the costs of land and capital
and must be independent of any other attributes of the community in which the
housing is located, including quality of education or the provision of public services.
Essentially, if any individual or group of individuals did not receive the mix of taxes,
public services, and price of housing they desired (and satisfied budget constraints)
they could move or create another community.
That all land and therefore, housing, regardless of location, would be valued
equally is clearly not true. However, the proper interpretation of Epple et. al. and other
researchers arguing the “no capitalization” viewpoint is that there should be no
capitalization due to differences in mixes in public services or, in our case, educational
quality or expenditures given that services are chosen by majority rule.
While empirical studies of capitalization received early criticism from the
proponents of the “no capitalization” viewpoint, the overwhelming evidence of
16

capitalization of both taxes and measures of both educational inputs and outputs makes
it hard to dismiss theories that argue for the existence of capitalization. One way to
reconcile the two views is that differences in land and housing prices due to factors
other than the level or quality of public services allows for inefficient public service
provision in those areas in which there are high property values due to attractive
amenities or proximity to employment. Also critical to the view that taxes and public
services should affect property values would seem to be the need for some communities
to inefficiently provide these services.
III.C

Empirical Evidence on the Extent and Existence of Property Tax Capitalization
Regardless of the theory that generates or does not generate a prediction of

property tax capitalization, it is an empirical question as to the extent and existence of
property tax capitalization.
While there are numerous differences and distinctions among studies of property
taxes and property values, we can broadly categorize them based on the type of data
used in the study and the type of tax capitalization they examine. Some studies,
particularly early studies, used aggregated data in which the measure of property value is
the mean or median house value in a municipality or some other geographical region.
These data are generally from the Census of Population and Housing though some
studies have also used data on equalized property values from state revenue cabinets.
Alternatively, other studies, generally more recent, use micro-data, data on individual
housing units generally from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), the American Housing
Survey (AHS), property value assessors (PVA) and sometimes data on individual
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households (without geographic identifiers) from the Census of Population and
Housing. The value of the housing is usually one of three measures: self-reported
values (Census of Population and Housing, AHS), assessed values (PVA, equalized
values) or market sales (MLS, PVA). Many users of the AHS for studies on the
determinants of property value will only use data on households who, in addition to
reporting their valuation of their own home, also report a recent sale; similarly, while
the PVA may provide assessed values for all properties, most researchers prefer to use
PVA data on actual sale values rather than assessed values.
In addition to distinctions in studies based on the type of data used, there are distinctions in the type of capitalization examined. Some studies examine
interjurisdictional capitalization of property taxes and public services – relating
differences in property values among different communities to differences in the
property taxes, amenities, and public services in these communities. Almost all studies
using aggregated data are used to examine interjurisdictional capitalization through
micro-data, observations on individual houses across a number of communities usually
within a single metropolitan area can also be used to examine interjurisdictional
capitalization as well. It is these studies that are most useful in providing tests of the
Tiebout hypothesis, specifically the extent to which households do base locational
decisions on local taxes and public services and whether local public services appear to
be efficiently provided.
Alternatively, other studies examine intrajurisdictional capitalization of property
taxes, differences in the impacts of property taxes on property values within a single
18

community. These studies all use micro-data. While studies on interjurisdictional
capitalization generally use equalized or effective property tax rates, for studies of
intrajurisdictional capitalization differences in property tax rates among households
cannot be due to different statutory rates, but are due to different effective rates of
property tax. These differences must be due to differences in the ratio of assessed to
market value within the community.
III.D Complications to the Simple Model of Property Tax Capitalization
As mentioned, the log-linear specification discussed earlier is only an
approximation to the theoretical relationship between property values and property tax
rates. As discussed earlier, we can think of property value as reflecting the value of
household characteristics and amenities (h), public services (g), and amenities (a) with
q(h,g,a) being the rental value of this bundle of characteristics of the house and the
community in which it is located. Then, following de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999)
and Oates (1969), the value of a house is simply
v=

(q(h, a, v) − τv )
T

∑ (i − π )

t

t =1

The value of the property will depend on its expected life (T), the nominal interest rate,
and the inflation rate (π). The real interest rate is r = i – π. However, this formulation is
complicated even more by the fact that households that itemize get to deduct property
tax payments. Letting t represent the marginal income tax rate if the household
marginal investment is taxable, the relationship is given by
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v=

(q(h, a, v) − (1 − t )τv )
T

∑ (i (1 − t ) − π )

t

t =1

since the household only effectively pays (1-t) of its property taxes with t(τv) being
deducted. The interest rate is also adjusted to reflect the after-tax rate of return on an
alternative investment, i(1-t)-π. Thus, to precisely determine the impact of the property
tax on property values, de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999), Do and Sirmans (1994), and
Palmon and Smith (1998) attempt to control for inflation and interest rates as well as
marginal income tax rates.
III.E

Evidence on Tax Capitalization
Yinger et. al. (1988) provides an excellent summary and review of studies

examining the capitalization of property taxes into property values prior to 1988 from
which we borrow heavily in our discussion and summary of the findings of this
literature. While Yinger et. al. (1988) categorizes studies according to whether they use
aggregate data or micro-data and examine the level of taxes or use micro-data and
examine the impact of tax changes, we classify studies according to whether they are
estimating interjurisdictional capitalization or intrajurisdictional capitalization because,
as briefly discussed earlier, we believe there are reasons to think the impacts might be
different. However, for all practical purposes, this distinction is essentially the same as
that based on aggregate and micro-data based studies.
As just discussed, the rate of capitalization found in a study depends on prior
assumptions about the discount rate and the horizon (length of time) considered.
Studies generally use a discount rate of 3% to 8% and a time horizon of forty years to
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infinite. Yinger et. al. calculate a capitalization rate for each of the studies they review
using a discount rate of 3% and an infinite time horizon. As much as possible our
discussion will focus on the capitalization rate based on this discount rate and time
horizon. To put this capitalization rate in clearer perspective with a 3% discount rate
and an infinite life, a $1.00 tax differential between two houses (with identical attributes
otherwise) would lead to a difference in property value of $33.33 if there is full capitalization. A capitalization rate of 50% means that the $1.00 difference in taxes results in
a $16.67 difference in price.
III.E.1 Interjurisdictional Tax Capitalization
Table III.A.1 summarizes the findings of studies that examine interjurisdictional
tax capitalization, that is, studies that either have aggregate data on municipalities or
census tracts or micro-data on more than a single municipality. As the table suggests,
the estimated capitalization rate varies dramatically among studies from no
capitalization to “over-capitalization”, a rate of 127%. For studies using aggregated
data, the median capitalization rate is 51% and the average is 53.5%. Studies using
micro-data but estimating interjurisdictional tax capitalization find a much lower rate of
capitalization with estimates ranging from 0 to 31%, a much narrower range with a
median rate of 26% and an average of 25%. It should be noted that for many of the
studies using micro-data the nature of the study requires that the interjurisdictional
capitalization rate must equal the intrajurisdictional capitalization rate.
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III.E.2 Intrajurisdictional Tax Capitalization
A problem frequently encountered in estimating these hedonic equations is the
appropriate measure and control of differences in public services among communities.
Failure to account or accurately measure these differences in public services makes the
interpretation of the coefficients on the tax rate difficult. One approach to controlling
for differences in public services is to only consider examining the relationship between
property values and tax payments for houses within a single municipality in which
there are no differences in public services or amenities.
Of course these differences in tax payments are of a different nature than
differences in tax payments across jurisdictions. Differences in tax payments within a
jurisdiction are not generally due to differences in tax rates but due to differences in
how properties are assessed relative to their market value.
For micro-data based studies that estimate the same value for both
interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional capitalization we find the median rate of
capitalization to be 28.5% and the average to be about 44%.
For studies either examining capitalization in a single municipality or calculating
a separate measure of intrajurisdictional capitalization when they have micro-data on
houses in more than one jurisdiction, the median estimate for capitalization is 40% and
the average is 38%. As seen in Table III.A.2, of the seventeen estimates coming from
fourteen studies, three estimates are no capitalization with only one estimate exceeding
80% (Palmon and Smith (1998b). Estimates in ten of the twenty studies ranged between
40% and 66%.
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III.E.3 What can be said about Property Tax Capitalization?
The divergence in estimates of property tax capitalization, even when
standardizing discount rates and the time horizon, makes it difficult to reach any strong
conclusions about how property taxes affect property values. Most of the extremely
low estimates of capitalization were from studies prior to 1980 as were the studies
finding 100% or more for capitalization rates. Studies using microdata generally seem
to have a narrower range of estimates even when estimating interjurisdictional
capitalization and while there is still a divergence in estimates, this range appears to
have decreased in the more recent literature.
What can be concluded? While a few studies and researchers may disagree, it
appears from the majority of the literature that capitalization of property taxes does
occur but the evidence does not generally suggest full capitalization. Capitalization
rates seem to vary among regions and even municipalities, and, as suggested by Edel
and Sclar (1974), Linneman and Voith (1991), and de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999)
among houses and characteristics of the homeowners. Given these caveats, the vast
majority of estimates seem to indicate capitalization rates for property taxes in the range
of 40% to 65%.
III.F

Education and Property Values
As discussed earlier, in theory the market value of a home should reflect not only

the characteristics of the home and, as just discussed, property taxes, but also the
quality of public services and other amenities in the area in which the house is located.
While in theory this should apply for all public services and amenities valued by
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residents, in practice the focus of research has been on whether and how primary and
secondary education influence property values with a lengthy literature developing on
this topic.
Generally the focus of studies relating primary and secondary education to
property values focuses on two distinct issues:
1)

Is the level of expenditures on primary and secondary education efficient?

2)

What aspects of education are valued by residents: inputs or outputs?
Then, consistent with this characterization of the objectives of studies examining

the capitalization of educational services, we consider two ways of categorizing these
studies. First, studies might be categorized by what their purpose is in examining the
capitalization of educational services into property values. This method of categorization is not altogether unrelated to the second method of categorization, the measure of
educational services used in the study. For some studies, the purpose, rather than the
measure of educational services, is of interest; for others, primarily more recent studies,
the focus of the study is often the measure of educational service used.
III.F.1 Capitalization and the Efficient Provision of Educational Services
As discussed earlier, Oates viewed his “test” of the Tiebout hypothesis as a test
of whether taxes and public services influence location decisions. However, Oates
offered an informal test of the stronger conjecture made by Tiebout (1956) that local
public service provision with mobile residents should lead to efficient provision of these
services. Oates did this by considering the impact of a balanced-budget increase in
educational spending on property values. By balanced-budget, Oates calculates the
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impact of raising the effective property tax rate from 2% to 3% on the median house
value. He also determines how much additional revenue this will yield for education
and what impact the additional revenue will have on educational spending per student.
Then the impact of this increase in educational spending on property value plus the
impact of the tax increase give the balanced budget increase. Oates finds that the two
effects of a property tax increase roughly offset each other given his sample and the
parameters of his regression model.
Jan Brueckner (1979, 1982) also addresses the issue of whether local public
services, specifically educational services, are efficiently provided or not. Based on the
idea that how much a government spends on education and its property tax rate are
linked by the balanced budget condition, Brueckner (1979) asserts there is no need to
include the tax rate in the hedonic equation and the empirical test of efficiency is
whether the coefficient on educational expenditures is equal to zero in a regression in
which aggregate property value is the dependent variable. Brueckner (1979) employs
this framework to determine whether education (and other local public services) were
efficiently provided using the same data as Oates did in his 1969 article. Brueckner
finds that the coefficient on educational spending, while positive, is not significantly
different from zero. As Brueckner notes, the coefficient on educational spending could
be zero because some communities underprovide education while other communities
overprovide education. Thus Brueckner argues this result might be interpreted as
evidence that these communities do not systematically under- or overprovide
education.
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In the past twenty years, a number of studies have adopted Brueckner’s
framework and methodology. These include Deller (1990a, 1990b), Taylor (1995), Bates
and Santerre (2003), and Barrow and Rouse (2003). These studies generally suggest that
the level of educational expenditures do not appear to be set systematically too low or
too high if the objective of the municipality (school district) is to maximize property
values.
III.F.2 What Aspects of Education are Capitalized: Inputs or Outputs?
In economics a voluminous literature has developed on the relationship between
inputs in the production of education (student/teacher ratios, teacher education,
expenditures) and measures of educational “outputs,” typically scores on standardized
tests, usually of reading or mathematics, given at a state level. Occasionally, graduation
rates or earnings have been used as well.
While this extensive literature may have stimulated interest in how outputs,
specifically student scores on standardized tests, influence property values, the first
study that uses an output measure, Rosen and Fullerton (1977), actually precedes the
best known literature on the relationship between educational inputs and outputs.
Rosen and Fullerton argue that it should be the output or performance of the
educational system that should influence property values, not expenditures, as
presumably the quality of the school is what consumer/residents value. In their study,
Rosen and Fullerton essentially try to follow Oates (1969), replacing educational
expenditures with one of several test scores (mean reading, math, and an average of the
two for fourth grade students in the school district) in the hedonic equation. While
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Rosen and Fullerton found no relationship between property values and educational
expenditures in their data when they replaced educational expenditures with either the
math or reading score or the average of the two, there was a positive and significant
relationship between property values and educational output. Based on their estimates,
being in the highest rather than the lowest decile in reading scores would increase the
median property value by $20,699 (in 2003 prices)!
Following Rosen and Fullerton, a number of studies have included educational
test scores as explanatory variables with a summary of these studies and their findings
found in Table III.A.3. These studies generally use individual housing sales data rather
than aggregate or median property value in a community. Since these studies are not
focused directly on whether education is efficiently provided, that is, whether property
value in a community is maximized, use of individual housing sales affords more observations and less aggregation bias. In all of these studies, test scores were found to
have a positive and significant impact on property values, sometimes quantitatively
quite large. For example, Jud (1985) is one of the few studies using aggregate property
data and test scores, with the data coming from the 1980 census on towns and cities in
the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan area. Jud finds that that the average
district test score for 3rd grade reading has a positive impact on median owner-occupied
house value with a 4% increase in district test score associated with a 2% to 3% increase
in property value.
A number of studies have included both measures of educational inputs, usually
expenditures per pupil and educational output, test scores, as explanatory variables
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often with the explicit purpose of determining which measure seems to have more of an
effect on property values. Downes and Zabel, (2002) examine the relationship between
property values and schooling expenditures, minority enrollment and reading scores
for the Chicago metropolitan area from 1987-1991. They emphasize three results from
their study. First, that school-level attributes dominate district level attributes in the
estimation. Second, that changes in spending seems to have no impact on changes in
property values when changes in test scores are included in the regression. Finally,
they find the percentage minority, both African-American and Hispanic, has a negative
impact on property values.
A number of studies have examined the impact of the demographic composition
of schools, specifically the percentage African-American or, less frequently, percentage
Hispanic, on property values or, in a more dynamic setting, the impact of a change in
minority composition on property value with this change associated with busing
(integration) policies. The earliest study of this nature is Clotfelter (1975) which
examines how the change in percentage minority in schools from 1960 to 1970 in
Atlanta affected the median property value of predominately white census tracts associated with those schools. He found a negative and significant impact attributing a decrease in median house value of anywhere between 0% to 25% in some of the white
census tracts. Gill (1983) examines the impacts of desegregation by comparing the
capitalization rate from 1975 to 1979 of single family houses in suburbs of Columbus,
OH where there was no desegregation to the capitalization rate of single family houses
in the city of Columbus in which a desegregation plan was pursued. Bogart and
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Cromwell (2000), while not explicitly measuring the impact of the racial mix of students
on housing values, do consider the impact of redistricting primarily for the purposes of
integration on housing values in Shaker Heights, a wealthy suburb of Cleveland, Ohio
between 1983 and 1994, a period during which time boundaries of the schools were
changed several times primarily for the purpose of integration. They find a significant
negative impact of redistricting on property values, with the impact of this redistricting
being reduced when the student has access to transportation. The impact of the percent
of non-white students, while negative, was not statistically significant in any of the
hedonic estimates.
III.F.3 How Does Education Affect Property Values?
The variety and ambiguity of educational measures makes it difficult to talk
about a specific value for a capitalization rate as was done with property taxes.
However, some conclusions appear to emerge from a review of this literature. First,
both educational inputs, generally measured simply as expenditures, and education
outputs such as scores on standardized tests affect property values with some of these
effects being quantitatively quite large. Second, while for specific school districts
increases or decreases in educational spending might increase property values in the
district, there does not appear to be strong evidence suggesting that level of spending
on primary and secondary education could be generally increased or reduced to
increase property values. Finally, the composition of students in the school, specifically
changes in the racial mix due to integration plans have had significant negative impacts
on property values in areas in which integration has occurred.
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Table III.A.1 A Summary of Inter-Jurisdictional Tax Capitalization

Authors

Oates

Year

1969

Unit of
Observation

Municipalities

Location(s)

New Jersey

Measure of
Economic
Key Explanatory
Time Period Sample Size Activity
Variables
(Dependent
Variable)

1960

53

Hienberg &
Oates

1970

Municipality

Boston Area

1960

23

King

1973

House

New Haven
Area

1967-1969

1892

Median
House
Value

Log of effective tax
rate, Log of school
expenditures per
pupil, Log of nonschool
expenditures per
capita

Log of effective tax
rate, School
expenditures per
pupil
Actual tax payment
minus predicted
payment in low-tax
town given current
assessment,
Student test scores,
Perceived school
House Sales
quality from
Price
questionnaire,
Perceived quality
of other services,
Public provision of
water, sewage
disposal, or
garbage collection
Median
House
Value

301i

Estimated Tax
Capitalization
Rate
Assumed discount
Summary/Implications
(With 3%
rate and time line Regarding Tax Capitalization
discount rate
and infinite
Horizon)

61%

5%, 40 years

Full capitalization

71%

5%, 40 years

100%

18%

5%-8%, 40 years

30%-50%

Oates

Pollakowski

1973

1973

Municipality

New Jersey

Municipality

New Jersey &
San Francisco
Area

1960

1960

53

Median
House
Value

Log of effective tax
rate, Log of school
expenditures per
pupil, Log of nonschool
expenditures per
capita

53 & 19

Median
House
Value

Log of effective tax
rate, Log of school
expenditures per
pupil

In the range
1930, 1940,
of 64-78
1950, 1960,
depending
1970
on year

Median
House
Value

Edel & Sclar

1974

Municipality

Boston Area

Gustely

1976

Municipality

Syracuse Area

1970

100

Median
House
Value

McDougal

1976

Census Tract

Los Angeles
Area

1970

173

Median
House
Value

Meadows

1976

Municipality

New Jersey

1960, 1970

53 (1960) &
44 (1970)

Median
House
Value

31

61%

5%, 40 years

Full capitalization

n/a

n/a

Capitalization estimates are
sensitive to model
specification.

8%, infinite

50% in 1970: Capitalization
dissipates as long-run
equilibrium is approached

8%, 40 years

≈ 65%

5%, infinite

complete capitalization

n/a

Capitalization in 1960 and
1970

Nominal tax rate
(all years),
Effective tax rate
(1970), School
20% (1970)
expenditures per
pupil, Highway
expenditures per
square mile
Equalized school
tax rate, Equalized
non-school tax rate,
Own-source school
expenditures per
34%
pupil, Own-source
non-school
expenditures per
capita
Equalized tax rate,
12th grade test
score, Crime rate,
62%
Fire insurance
index, Recreation
index
Equalized tax rate,
School
expenditures per 127% (1960),
pupil, non-school
44% (1970)
expenditures per
capita

San Mateo Co,
1971-1973
CA

Noto

1976

House

King

1977

Municipality

New Jersey

1960

53

Rosen &
Fullerton

1977

Municipality

New Jersey

1960, 1970

53

House

London,
Ontario

Chinloy

1978

1974

17,000

1224

Nominal tax rate
interacted with
House Sales
percentage change
Price Per
in population and
Square Foot
with percentage of
units for sale
Median tax
payment, Log of
school
Median
expenditures per
House
pupil, Log of nonValue
school
expenditures per
capita
Median
House
Value

Log of effective tax
rate, 4th grade test
scores

Owner
Effective tax rate
Estimate of
minus rate of
Market
income tax credit
Value

Gronberg

1979

Municipality

Chicago Area

1970

83

Median
House
Value

Dusansky, et.
al.

1981

School District

Suffolk County,
NY

1970

62

Median
House
Value

Gabriel

1981

Municipality

San Francisco
Area

1978-1979

30

Nominal municipal
tax rate, Nominal
school tax rate,
Municipal
expenditures per
capita, School
expenditures per
pupil
Equalized tax rate,
School
expenditures per
pupil,

Change in
Change in Mean
Mean House
Tax Payment
Value

32

31%

11.4%, infinite

more than full

36%

5%, 40 years

67%

58%

6%, 40 years

88%

0%

5%, 40 years

0%

n/a

no capitalization

22%

5%, 10-40 years

43%-96%, depending on time
horizon

36%

n/a

Cap. Ratio = 12

Ihlanfeldt
&Jackson

1982

City

St. Louis, MO.

1976

1321

Owner
Systematic
Estimate of assessment error,
Market
Random
Value
assessment error

66%

26%

n/a

Taxes capitalized to a lesser
extent than services

22%

n/a

Cap Ratio = 7.3

Lea

1982

House

U.S.

1968

680

Average effective
Owner
tax rate in county,
Estimate of
Average
Market
expenditure per
Value
capita in county

Rosen

1982

Municipality

San Francisco
Area

1978-1979

64

Change in
Change in Mean
Mean House
Tax Payment
Value

33

Cap. Ratio of 22 for
systematic assessment errors.
real rate, 40 years
Larger but insignificant ratio
for random assessment errors.

Table III.A.2 A Summary of Inter-Jurisdictional Tax Capitalization

Unit of
Time
Location(s)
Sample Size
Observation
Period

Measure of
Economic
Activity
(Dependent
Variable)

Key Explanatory
Variables

Estimated Tax Capitalization Rate
(With 3% discount rate and infinite
Horizon)

Summary/Implications
Regarding Tax Capitalization

Authors

Year

Wicks, et. al.

1976

House

Missoula,
Montana

1965

64

Observed Minus
Predicted Sales
Price

Change in tax payment

50%

Cap. Ratio = 17

Smith

1970

House

San
Francisco
Area

19661968

301

Observed Minus
Change in tax payment,
Predicted Sales
Proximity to revaluation
Price

44%

Cap. Ratio = 14.5. Tax changes
from revaluation are anticipated.

Church

1974

House

Martinez,
CA

19671970

957

n/a

over capitalization

Log of House
Sale Price

Log of (discount rate plus
effective tax rate)

34

Edelstien

1974

House

Philadelphia 1967Area
1969

Moody

1974

House

San
Francisco
Area

Wales & Weins

1974

House

Surrey,
British
Columbia

Case

1978

House

2143

1963

518

1970

1828

1971
Boston Area
and
& Hanford,
1972CA
1975

2195 &
1014

House Sales
Price

Property tax payment per
Cap. Ratio = 7.75 for 4
bedroom, # dummy
23% and 47% for 4 and 2 bedroom homes
bedroom: Cap. Ratio = 15.5 for
respectively
variables for groups of
2 bedroom
communities

Dummy variable for
Deviation of
location in the
Sales Price from
jurisdiction with a transit
pre-1963 trend in
tax increase, Access to
the Jurisdiction
new transit station

≈ 60%

Cap. Ratio = 18-22

House Sales
Price

Effective tax rate

n/a

no capitalization

House Sales
Price

Effective tax rate, Actual
and predicted assessed
value, School
expenditures per pupil,
Sewer tie in, Paved road

Interjurisdictional: 26%
Intrajurisdictional: 50% & zero

Interjurisdictional cap. Ratio =
8.8: Intrajurisdictional cap.
Ratio = 16.6 (insignificant in
one case)

35

Hamilton

1979

House

Toronto
Area

San Mateo
Municipality
Co, CA

1961

410

House Sales
Price

Community fiscal surplus
(expenditures minus tax
payments), Education
spending per pupil

Intrajurisdictional: 50%
Interjurisdictional: 28%

Intrajurisdictional cap. Ratio =
16.8: Interjurisdictional cap.
Ratio = 9.37 (based on fiscal
surplus

107%

100%

19691970

53

House Value

Effective tax rate, School
expenditures per pupil,
Nonschool expenditures
per capita

Reinhard

1981

Richardson &
Thalheimer

1981

House

Fayette Co.
1973Lexington,
1974
KY

861

Log of House
Value

Dummy variable for
location in the city,
Sanitary sewers

15%

73%

Goodman

1983

House

New Haven 1967Area
1969

1835

Box-Cox
Transformation
of Sales Price

Effective tax rate,
Average house price in
the jurisdiction

Intrajurisdictional ≈ 65%
Interjurisdictional ≈ 25%

Intrajurisdictional: 10-122%
(based on fiscal surplus)

Palmon & Smith

1998

House

501

Log (Sale Price)

Municipal Utility District
Tax Rates

62%

501

Log (Sale Price)

Municipal Utility District
Tax Rates

55%

566

Sale Price

Tax Payment

32% to 42%

Houston

1981
Palmon & Smith

1998

House

Houston

1981
de Bartolome &
Rosenthal

1999

House

U.S.

1985/1
989

36

Table III.A.3 Education and Property Values
Author(s)

Oates, W.E.

Year

1960 Census, Northern
1969 New Jersey townships
and cities

Pollakowski, H.O. 1973

Edel, M.;
E.

Sclar,

Grether, D. M.;
Mieszkowski, P.

Clotfelter, C.M.

Data

1974

1960 Census, San
Francisco-OaklandSan Jose townships
and cities

1930-70 Census,
Boston MSA
townships

Unit of
Observation

Dependent
Variable

Township

Median Value,
Owner-Occupied
Dwellings

Township

Median Value,
Owner-Occupied
Dwellings

Township

Median Value,
Owner-Occupied
Dwellings

Census Tract

ΔMedian Value
'60-'70, OwnerOccupied;
ΔMedian gross
rent, '60-'70

Measure of Educational
Services

Results

Comments

Expenditures per pupil

2SLS gives capitalization of
educational expenditures;
balanced budget effect on
property value of expenditure
increase is approximately zero.

Seminal piece. Oates
considers this evidence of
capitalization (primarily of
taxes) as evidence of
"Tiebout" equilibrium.

Expenditures per pupil

Comment on Oates (1969),
Weak & unstable capitalization criticizing instruments (2SLS)
of educational expenditures
and specification of public
services

Expenditures per pupil

Capitalization rate for
expenditures decreases from
1950 to 1970 as does tax
capitalization

Δ% Minority (AfricanAmerican) High School
Enrollment

Δ% Minority is negative and
significant on ΔMedian House
Values in White Census Tracts;
Median house values changed
0% to 25% as a result of
desegregation plans

1974

1975

1960-70 Census,
Atlanta MSA
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Argues that Oates (1969) is
only short run equilibrium.
Long run capitalization
should disappear.

Rosen, H.S.;
Fullerton, D.J.

1977

Brueckner, J.K.

Same as Oates (1969),
53 municipalities in
1979
Northern New Jersey,
1960 from Census.

Sonstelie, J.C.;
Portney, P.R.

San Mateo County,
1980 CA, 1969-1970 (1453
obs.)

Jud, G.D.;
Watts, J.M.

Brueckner, J.K.

1981

1982

1960-70 Census,
Northern New Jersey

Charlotte, NC 1977

54 Massachusetts
communities, 1976.

Follows and replicates Oates
Expenditures per pupil,
Expenditures in 1970 perform
(1969) argues inputs
Median Value,
Township
Owner-Occupied Test score (average 4th poorly; test scores have positive (expenditures) should not be
used instead of outputs
Dwellings
grade, reading and math)
& significant effect
(achievement scores).
Introduces the municipal
budget constraint to eliminate
the tax rate. Argues the
Median Property
negative sign of coefficient on
Value, weighted
Negative and significant
educational expenditures in
Municipality
for ownerEducational Expenditures
coefficient on Educational
2SLS results suggests that
occupied and all
Expenditures in 2SLS
efficient result is
units
indeterminant given that
median property value is
dependent variabl
Argues that gross value
Elementary expenditure
Finds positive & significant
addresses the difficulties
Single Family
Gross of tax
per pupil; Reading Scores impact of both spending and test raised by Hamilton (1976)
Home
House Sale Price
and others about long run
(3rd grade)
scores on gross rent.
versus short run Tiebout.
Single Family
House Sale Price
Home

Municipality
(community)

Aggregate
Property Value

Test score is a significant, 1/2
Test Score (3rd reading grade level increases house value Uses hedonic to determine
675 ($77). Minority not
grade average);
prices to estimate a demand
% Minority
significant with test scores
for school quality.
included.

Educational Expenditures
(less capital outlays)

38

Positive but statistically
insignificant coefficient on
Education Expenditures

Again uses the budget
constraint to eliminate tax
rate. Argues that coefficient
on educational expenditures
not significantly different
from zero means that efficient
provision of education cannot
be rejected for the sample.

Gill, H. L.

Impact of desegregation:
Finds large houses (4 or more
comparing changes in
MLS for Columbus,
capitalization rates for
bedrooms) in suburbs
Single Family
1983 OH, 1975-1979 (5888
House Sale Price
appreciated after desegregation
Home
suburbs (exempt from
obs.)
required in city of Columbus.
desegregation) to city
(subject to it)

Vandell, K.D.;
Zerbst, R. H.

1984

Dallas, TX, 1971-80

Jud, G.D.

1985

1980 Census, Los
Angeles and San
Francisco Bay

Deller, S.C.

1990 Illinois, 1982 (96 obs.)

Deller, S.C.

58 small towns (1,0005,000) scattered
1990
throughout Maine
(US), 1986

Walden, M.L.

1990

Raleigh, NC 1987

Uses ridge regression to
Minority enrollment &
reduce difficulties with
% minority in elementary desegregation adversely affect
Single Family
multicollinearity. Examines
House Sale Price
school
house values but small
Home
impacts of desegregation over
elasticities, .05 to .23
time by use of a panel.
Follows Rosen and Fullerton
Test score is a significant. 4%
(1977) with test scores in
increase in district score
Median Value,
District test score (3rd
Oates (1969) framework.
Township or
associated with 2 to 3% increase
Does not use 2SLS but
Owner-Occupied
grade reading) &
in values. Minority not
city
addresses endogeneity
Dwellings
%Minority
significant with test scores
following Ihanfeldt and
included.
Jackson (1982).
County

Community

Aggregate
Property Value

Aggregate
Property Value

Single Family
House Sale Price
Home

Total Educational
Expenditures

Total Educational
Expenditures

No evidence of overexpenditure
on education

No evidence of overexpenditure
on education

Standardized test score Capitalization of test scores rate
(CAT for elementary &
is higher (more likely to be
middle) & SAT for high significant) for high school and
school; %minority
middle school than elementary

39

Argues that aggregation of
jurisdictions to county
eliminates difficulties with
overlapping jurisdictions.
Follows Brueckner (1979,
1982, 1983) methodlogy.
Argues that previous studies
that draw on more than one
labor market might be
misspecified.
Argues that lower
capitalization rate for
elementary is consistent with
the more extensive use of
magnet schools at elementary
level

Taylor, L.L.

Hayes, K.J.;
Taylor, L.L.

Haurin, D.R.;
Brasington, D.

1995

1996

1996

1980 Census, Hartford,
Community
CT MSA

Aggregate
Property Value

Dallas, TX 1987 with
Single Family
House Sale Price
charactersitics of
Home
elementary schools

Ohio MSA's 1991
(9509 obs.)

School Districts in
Cleveland, OH, USA,
1976-1994

Single Family
House Sale Price
Home

OwnerOccupied
House

Bogart, W.T.;
Cromwell, B.A.

1997

Goodman, A.C;
Thibodeau, T.G.

Dallas, TX (US),
1995:1-1997:1 merged
Single Family
House Sale Price
1998
with data on
Home
elementary school
zone

Expenditures per pupil

Follows Brueckner (1979,
1982, 1983) methodlogy.
No evidence of overexpenditure Argues that previous studies
that draw on more than one
on education
labor market might be
misspecified.

Spending has no impact on
An attempt to distinguish the
Expenditures per pupil;
property values. Tests scores do
contribution of the school to
average math test scores
but impact is due to "school"
test results rather than simply
for school, absolute and
effect, controlling for
use the raw test score.
"school" effect
demographics of students
Proportion of students
Test measure is a significant. 2
passing all 4 sections of
s.dev. difference in test scores
Ohio 9th grade
raises mean house value by 18%
proficiency test

House Sale Price

District

Substantial difference in
property values among
neighboring school districts

Follows Oxaca (1973)
methodology. Decomposes
the difference in property
values into explained
(housing characteristics) and
unexplained (school district)
for houses.

Technique for determining
A contrast to the maintained
submarkets. Submarkets are
assumption in hedonic
Elementary school zone defined by groups of elementary
literature of a single
school zones. Here there are
continuous hedonic function.
submarkets within a district.
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Bogart, W.T.;
Cromwell, B.A.

2000

Brasington, D.M. 2000

Weimer, D. L.;
Wolkoff, M.J.

Ohio MSA's 1991
(9509 obs.)

Value-added: Δ% of
Value-added measures not
proficient students
between grades; Level: % significant in hedonic; some of
the levels of test scores and
Single Family
of proficient students;
House Sale Price
expenditures per pupil and
Home
Inputs: expenditures,
student/teacher ratio, teacher salary are significant and
positive.
teacher salary &
experience

Shaker Heights, OH
(US), 1983-1994

Difference-in-Difference
Disrupting neighborhood school
estimation before and after
Elementary only. Busing
(busing to non-neighborhood)
(available or not);
redistricting school catchment
reduces house values by 9.9%.
%Nonwhite; Change in
areas. Uses Oaxaca
Single Family
Adding transportation option
House Sale Price
decomposition for before and
Home
Schooling (neighborhood
(busing) adds 2.6% if to same
or not); 3rd grade test
after redistricting to
school. Racial composition has
scores
decompose impact of district
insignificant impact.
change.
House Sale Price

Exam scores for
Positive impact of exam scores
Uses the median value of
elementary schools
on property values even
homes in Census tract (or
(English Language Arts);
controlling for school
block) to control for
Monroe County
Single Family
Single-family
For high school: %
demographics. Small increases
2001
neighborhood effects with IV
(Rochester, NY) 1997
Home
House Sale Price
reduced price lunch;
in scores (1%) can lead to
estimation to address
graduation rate,
significant increases in property
simultaneity issues.
suspension rate, advance
values (0.6 to 4.7%)
placement rate
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Argues that school district
quality was a significant
determinant of defeat of
Significant negative coefficient
voucher proposition (174) in
Education "premium" on relationship between housing
California. Consistent with
price premiums and voting
capitalized into housing
expected reduction in
returns
property value in good
districts as a result of a
voucher.

2001

Voting results on
voucher initiative in
Los Angeles County,
1993.

2002

American Housing
Survey, Chicago,
1987-1991 merged
with Illinois SchoolReport Cards

Barrow, L.;
Rouse, C.E.

2003

Census of
Governments, 1977,
1987

Independent
School
Districts

Aggregate
Property Value

State Aid

Bates, L.J.;
Santerre, R.E.

2003

Connecticut
communities,1994-95

Community

Aggregate
Property Value

Total Educational
Expenditures

Brunner, et. al.

Downes, T.A.;
Zabe, J.E.

Gibbons, S.;
Machin, S.

Precinct

Percent voting in
favor of the
initiative

School-level attributes dominate
Per-pupil district-level
district level for estimation.
expenditures; %African
Spending has no effect on
Single Family Owner-estimated
American in
property value when test scores
Home
House value
school/district; %Hispanic
(8th grade reading) included.
in school/district; Reading
Negative impact of minorities on
scores
house values.

Uses 1st difference approach
between 1987 and 1991 with
dependent variable being
difference in homeowner's
perceived values. Instruments
for district fiscal variables
(tax rate and expenditures).

Follows Brueckner (1979,
1982, 1983) methodology of
eliminating property tax
through balanced budget
condition
Follows Brueckner (1979,
Positive and significant
1982, 1983) methodology.
Focus is on minimum
coefficient on educational
expenditures -- 10% increase in expenditure floors, arguing
expenditures increases property evidence does not suggest that
in Conneticutt these have lead
values by 4.3%.
to overspending on education.
IV/First Difference Results:
Increases in State Aid increase
Property Value

UK, Government Land
Employs spatial econometric
Primary School
Positive coefficient on
Registry; primary
techniques to address the
Performance (Key Stage
performance measure -- 10%
school performance Single Family
weaker link between
House Sale Price 2, Level 4), proportion of
2003
increase in performance leads to
Home
from Department of
residential location and school
children reaching target
6.9% increase in house prices.
Education and
attendance in UK (than in US)
level at age 11.
Employment, 1996-99
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Ohio MSA's 1991
(9509 obs.)

Single Family
House Sale Price
Home

Calculates an implicit price
for educational quality (test
Estimates separate hedonics for
score) from a hedonic. Then
6 Ohio MSA's. Finds that
in a 2SLS estimate uses
Proportion of students
proficiency measure has positive
implicit price to estimate a
passing all 4 sections of
impact on house values -- 1%
supply equation for
Ohio 9th grade
point increase in score raises
educational quality -- how
proficiency test
value by $708. Estimates a
much area residents will
supply elasticity of .14.
increase quality with an
increase in price

43

IV.

Taxes and Property Values: How and Why does it Matter?
Why should we care about the impacts of taxes and other fiscal policies on

property values? The most obvious reason is simply the tremendous wealth and
investment in real estate. Changes in fiscal policies can mean significant changes in the
wealth of property owners and in the prices paid by those who wish to own property.
While this may be reason enough for understanding the interaction between fiscal
policies and property values, economists studying impacts of fiscal policies on property
values tend to focus on what these impacts suggest about the efficiency of the fiscal
policies. That the price of an asset, in this case the value of real estate, changes, does
not, in itself, imply anything about the desirability or efficiency of this price change or
what may have caused it. An increase in the value of an asset will lead to a “winner,”
the owner of the asset and a “loser,” the potential purchaser of the asset and, on net,
there is no apparent gain to society. However, as we discussed in Section III, much of
the literature reviewed here, most notably Brueckner (1979, 1982) and Sonstelie and
Portney (1978) argued that if public services were efficiently provided then property
values would be unaffected by a balanced-budget change.
Because property values change for a reason and not just randomly, it is wrong
to think of these changes as simply a transfer between owner and buyer in a zero-sum
game with no net gain to society. Property values increase with balanced-budget
changes in government services if the benefits of the additional services to the residents
exceed the additional taxes needed to pay for them; if the benefits of the additional
services are less than the taxes needed to pay for them, property values will decrease.

441i

Then how property values are affected by the fiscal policies of states and perhaps
more often local governments gives us evidence of how effective these policies are and
how they are valued by the residents who use and pay for these services – a measure of
efficiency in the provision and production of government services. Given the vast and
increasing expenditures on local goods and services such as primary and secondary
education and police and fire protection as well as the difficulties in directly measuring
output or quality of these services, evidence from real estate markets on efficiency in
these “markets” for public goods and services may be very valuable to more than
simply those involved in real estate markets alone.
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